China Plumps Squarely for Myanmar Junta

The Irrawaddy

China is once again flexing its muscles in Myanmar, and two recent moves by the leaders in Beijing may have sealed the fate of the initially very successful Spring Revolution. The first is official meetings between junta chief Min Aung Hlaing, and Chinese president Xi Jinping, and the other pressure on the United Wa State Army (UWSA) to stop providing other ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) with weapons.

In the first years after the February 2021 coup, China seemed to keep its options open. It kept a distance from Min Aung Hlaing and apparently turned a blind eye to the flow of weapons from the UWSA to EAOs such as the Brotherhood Alliance—the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA)—which spearheaded what became known as Operation 1027. Now, however, it is clear that the Chinese have concluded that the armed resistance is not going to win and are acting accordingly.

The first meeting between Min Aung Hlaing and Xi took place on May 9 in Moscow, on the sidelines of the celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in 1945. On May 10, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issue an official statement saying: “China will work with Myanmar to deepen the building of a community with a shared future, jointly advance high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, deliver on the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative, and bring more benefits to the people of the two countries.” It went on to state that “not long ago, in the aftermath of the severe earthquake in Mandalay that caused significant casualties and property damage, China moved the fastest to send rescue teams and emergency humanitarian supplies.” Furthermore, “China will continue supporting Myanmar in reconstruction. China supports Myanmar in pursuing a development path suited to its national conditions, safeguarding sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national stability, and advancing its domestic political agenda in a prudent manner.”

The next meeting occurred on another anniversary: at the end of August, delegates from the Beijing-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization met in the northern port city of Tianjin as China celebrated the 80th anniversary of what it considers its victory over Japan. Min Aung Hlaing was one of the guests and, once again, Xi stated that the two countries “should advance key projects in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, collaborate to combat cross-border crimes, and ensure the safety of Chinese personnel, institutions, and projects in Myanmar.” China has also endorsed the upcoming elections in Myanmar, and the junta has invited China to observe the voting.

For the EAOs fighting on the battlefields of Myanmar, an even more devastating move came on Aug. 20. Representatives of the MNDAA and the TNLA as well as the Shan State Army of the Shan State Progress Party, were summoned to the Pangkham (Panghsang) headquarters of the UWSA and its political wing, the United Wa State Party (UWSP). There, according to videos posted on YouTube by the Wa News Agency, they were told: “Wa State will no longer provide weapons, transportation, or financial support to any organization in any form, for any reason, at any time, or anywhere.”

A UWSP spokesman added, “China has imposed sanctions on the Wa State government on the grounds that they support your organizations, resulting in the loss of billions of Chinese yuan.” That spokesman was no other than Zhao Guoan—referred to as “Sao Kaw Ann” in the news dispatch—who was born in Nansan in China’s Yunnan province and was among the Chinese Red Guard volunteer who came across the border to fight alongside the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in the late 1960s. Most of those volunteers were withdrawn after Mao Zedong died in 1976 and China’s policy changed from exporting revolution to fostering trade relations with neighboring countries, but some remained behind in Myanmar, and Zhao was one of them.

Zhao joined the UWSP after the 1989 mutiny, which saw the entire CPB leadership forced into exile in China and the former communist rebel army split up into four ethnic armies, of which the UWSA was and still is the strongest. The UWSA subsequently entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military, and Zhao has taken part in several peace talks with the central government. He is also in charge of foreign affairs for the Wa authorities and became vice chairman of the UWSP following the death of his predecessor Xiao Minliang in November 2023.

Even prior to the Wa announcement, the Chinese had forced the MNDAA to withdraw from the city of Lashio, a major center for trade and commerce in northern Shan State, which it had captured in August 2024. The Chinese wanted to see a return to “normalcy,” which for them meant cross-border trade as usual.

For the same reason, the TNLA has also come under pressure from the Chinese to withdraw from major towns it has captured on the main road from Mandalay to the Chinese border. The TNLA has so far refused to comply, but with the end of support from the UWSA, its main source of military equipment, it is uncertain whether it can hold out much longer. The end of supplies of weapons from the UWSA is also bound to affect the fighting ability of ethnic Burman groups, which are allied with the MNDAA and the TNLA and completely dependent on arms and ammunition provided by them.

Notably, two major EAOs, the AA and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), were not present at the Pangkham meeting. Beginning in 2015, the AA benefited from support from the UWSA and fought alongside the MNDAA in northern Shan State. In recent years, it has taken over most of Rakhine State and captured huge quantities of military hardware, including armored vehicles, from the junta. As a result, the AA is no longer dependent on arms supplied by the UWSA or the MNDAA, and seems bent on taking over the entire state.

The KIA, menwhile, has its own arms factories and has received only some ammunition, not any large consignments of weapons from the UWSA. But it depends on China for the supply of non-military items such as petrol, diesel, food, and medicines, and will find it hard to ignore Chinese pressure to enter into peace talks with the authorities in Naypyitaw. So far, though, it has shown no interest in talking to the central authorities.

The Kachins have bitter memories of the time from 1994 to 2011 when they had a ceasefire agreement with the central authorities. The Myanmar military broke almost everything that had been agreed upon and, eventually, launched a major offensive against the KIA.

The UWSA/UWSP’s new directives may, therefore, have only limited impact on the overall pattern of civil wars in Myanmar. But those decisions will make it much more difficult for some of the EAOs to be as effective as they were only a few years ago. And the Chinese have made it clear that they want and have the means to clear vital trade routes through northern Myanmar, and, eventually, secure the entire, strategically important China-Myanmar Economic Corridor down to the Indian Ocean, a regional cornerstone of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. For the people of Myanmar, regardless of nationality, China’s policies mean that they will for the foreseeable future continue to live under a despotic regime, enduring seemingly never-ending civil wars.