Myanmar's Meaningless Elections Draw Near

GlobalAsia

Elections in Myanmar have a habit of being exercises in dashed hopes, however eternal hope may spring. The upcoming legislative elections will be no different. This time, however, outside observers in the region - India, China, Japan and ASEAN - have a stake in maintaining good relations with Myanmar's junta. Handwringing by the West won't do much good if the country's neighbors won't cry foul, writes Bertil Lintner.

Published: December 2025 (Vol.20 No.4)

ELECTIONS FOR A NEW parliament in Myanmar will be held in three phases — the coming Dec. 28, and Jan. 11 and Jan. 25 next year — and Western countries and international human rights organizations have dismissed them as a fraudulent attempt to legitimize military rule. On Oct. 16, the European Union’s Special Representative for Human Rights, Kajsa Ollongren, called the upcoming vote a “regime-sponsored exercise” and emphasized that “the necessary conditions for free and fair elections have not been met.”

Human Rights Watch said on Nov. 17 that the junta, which seized power in a coup in February 2021, has “systematically dismantled the rule of law and the country’s nascent democratic systems, and ahead of the polls it has ramped up repression and violence… The Myanmar junta’s sham elections are a desperate bid for international legitimacy after nearly five years of brutal military repression.” To emphasize its point, Human Rights Watch said that “on July 29, the junta enacted the Law on the Prevention of Obstruction, Disruption, and Sabotage of Multiparty Democratic General Elections, which criminalizes criticism of the election by banning all speech, organizing, or protest that disrupts any part of the electoral process. Violators can face up to 20 years in prison and the death penalty.”

The National League for Democracy (NLD), which scored landslide victories in three previous elections — 1990, 2015 and 2020 — which were considered by observers to be sufficiently free and fair, was dissolved in March 2023 after refusing to register under a new electoral law imposed by the junta. The outcome of the 1990 parliamentary elections was ignored by the junta of that time, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The NLD was the wrong party and it won so the rules had to change. After those elections, the SLORC claimed that a “constituent assembly,” vested only with the task of drafting a new constitution, had been elected, not a Parliament. In the end, the elected body did not even become a constituent assembly; in fact, it was never convened. Instead, 100 of the 485 elected lawmakers were designated to participate in a “National Convention,” alongside 600 non-elected representatives appointed by the military, for the purpose of drafting a new constitution. It was not until 18 years later that the task was completed.

The NLD’s election victory in 2015 was respected, however, and a new government led by pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi was formed. But a second NLD victory in November 2020 was more than the military could accept, and the generals, contrary to what international poll observers had said, began talking about “election fraud.” When the NLD was about to form a government, the army stepped in and on Feb. 1, 2021 arrested the entire cabinet, including President Win Myint and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi.

With the NLD out of the picture this time and a new draconian election law in place, the military has made sure that its own party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which performed dismally in 2015 and 2020, is the only game in town. The West’s condemnation stands on solid ground, and no serious observer could possibly believe that the junta would hold free and fair elections. On the other hand, Myanmar’s immediate neighbors are likely to base their approach to the elections on geopolitical realities, not on taking the moral high ground. That will have a more decisive impact on the future of military-dominated rule in Myanmar than Western criticism.

Beijing’s policy is to maintain its dominant position in Myanmar in order to secure strategic access to the Indian Ocean. New Delhi seeks to counter that by moving closer to the authorities in Naypyidaw, an interest the Indians share with Japan. Bangladesh, meanwhile, has to find a way to repatriate more than a million Muslim Rohingya refugees who are languishing in camps on its side of the border, and that can only be done through negotiations with Naypyidaw. Judging from their past policies of “engagement” with the Myanmar military, the Australians may argue that “it’s better than nothing.”

Non-interference and consensus, the two cardinal principles of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), prevent it from exercising any influence over developments in a member state such as Myanmar. Peace and reconciliation outfits in Switzerland, Norway and perhaps other European countries may believe that they can step in and “mediate.” And then there is Russia, a major arms supplier to Myanmar. As early as September 2023, a Myanmar delegation visiting Moscow discussed “voter education” and “conditions for conducting elections” with their Russian hosts.

The key player in this imbroglio is China. Recent turmoil in northern Shan State disrupted the lucrative border trade between China and Myanmar, and made it more difficult for China to implement its schemes for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which will connect China with ports on the Bay of Bengal and vital trade routes across the Indian Ocean. The Chinese felt they had to intervene. In April this year, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a rebel group active in the area, agreed to withdraw from the city of Lashio and surrounding areas, which it had captured in July-August last year. The withdrawal came after China had brokered a ceasefire deal between the MNDAA and the Myanmar military. Under heavy pressure, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), an ethnic Palaung group, signed a similar ceasefire agreement on Oct. 29, and agreed to withdraw from the ruby-mining center of Mogok and to give up Nawnghkio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw, three key towns on the Mandalay-Lashio-Muse Highway, an important China-Myanmar trade route. The group had captured the towns earlier and then been under heavy bombardment by the Myanmar military.

The official daily The Global New Light of Myanmar reported on Oct. 15 that “Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and Chinese Special Envoy Mr Deng Xijiun held talks about further promotion of friendly relations and co-operation between the two countries… They also discussed the enhancement of friendship and strategic relations between Myanmar and China, sharing a good future as good neighbors, preparations to hold a free and fair election in Myanmar in the coming December, and support of China for holding the election.” Apparently, China is also going to send election observers to Myanmar.

Kachin, Rakhine, Karen and Karenni (Kayah) rebels as well as ethnic Burman armed groups, which were formed in the wake of the 2021 coup, are still battling the Myanmar military. But, contrary to claims made by the National Unity Government (NUG), which was set up by elected parliamentarians after the 2021 takeover, there is no co-ordinated resistance against military rule. Burman resistance groups are active in certain parts of the country, but they are localized and sometimes clash with each other over territorial claims and issues such as taxation and recruitment. Non-Burman armed groups are fighting for control over areas where their respective ethnic group lives and have neither the interest nor the capability to capture or attack Mandalay and other cities and towns in central Burma, let alone Naypyidaw or the former capital and commercial center Yangon. The NUG has made it clear that it opposes any election under the junta, but that has had no impact on the policies of Myanmar’s neighbors.

As part of its effort to counter China’s influence in Myanmar, India’s policy toward its eastern neighbor is based on immediate security concerns. Ethnic rebels from the northeastern Indian states of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur have sanctuaries on the other side of India’s long and porous border with Myanmar. Cross-border raids are not uncommon, and the turmoil inside Myanmar has forced between 30,000 and 40,000 mainly ethnic Kukis and Chins to seek refuge on the Indian side. Manipur has been particularly affected by the influx of Kukis, leading to the rise of local Meitei (Manipuri) nationalism. The Chins are a different matter. They have deep cultural and linguistic ties to the Mizo people of India’s Mizoram state, making it easier for them to rely on local community support. But that, in turn, has led to disputes between Mizoram authorities and the more unwelcoming central government in New Delhi.

During a meeting between Lt.-Gen. Ko Ko Oo of the Myanmar Army and Lt.-Gen. Ram Chander Tiwari, head of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command, in Kolkata in September, the Indian side said it “remains steadfast in its commitment to fostering strong defense ties with Myanmar, thereby contributing to regional peace and stability.” The Indians said they supported “initiatives to strengthen the Myanmar Army’s digital training capabilities, helping to improve information management within their organization.” India is also “committed to assist Myanmar in modernizing its defense infrastructure and promote technology-driven collaboration between the two nations.” There is no room for condemnation of the December-January Myanmar elections in that policy.

Bangladesh is in an awkward position after the Arakan Army, the predominant rebel group in Rakhine State, captured almost the entire area along the common border. Bangladesh wants to see the Rohingya refugees repatriated, but with whom should they now negotiate? The presence of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has also become a domestic issue. When they first came in large numbers in 2017, many Bangladeshis sympathized with their plight, but local people in in the area south of Chattogram (previously known as Chittagong), where most of the refugees are, have since started to blame the Rohingyas for various problems. They are accused of cutting down the area’s sparse forest to get firewood and there are violent conflicts between criminal groups alleged to be involved in drug trafficking, human smuggling and sexual exploitation of female refugees in the overcrowded camps.

Reuters reported on Aug. 25 that Muhammad Yunus, chief adviser to the Bangladesh government, had said that his country “has no scope to allocate more resources for the Rohingya refugees” and urged “the international community to find a sustainable solution to the crisis.” That, however, is unlikely to happen. What is often referred to as “the international community,” i.e. the West, is currently more preoccupied with Russia’s war against Ukraine and the Israel-Palestine conflict than focusing on and allocating resources to the Rohingyas. In fact, the United States, the largest donor, has sharply reduced its funding following the global suspension of most US foreign assistance earlier this year by President Donald Trump. Hence, Bangladesh has no alternative but to talk to whoever is in power in Naypyidaw, and that, now and after the elections, is the Myanmar military. At the same time, Bangladesh cannot ignore the presence of the Arakan Army on the border, where any repatriation would have to take place.

ASEAN is still sticking to its “five-point consensus,” an agreement reached in Jakarta in April 2021 recommending an immediate cessation of violence, a constructive dialogue chaired by a special ASEAN envoy to Myanmar, more humanitarian assistance, and visits to Myanmar by the special envoy. But that was also a non-starter. When the Myanmar military ignored the recommendations, there was nothing ASEAN could do because that would go against its non-interference principle. According to a statement issued on Oct. 25, ASEAN remains in favor of delivering humanitarian aid and wants “to build trust toward convening an inclusive national dialogue, with the aim of achieving a durable peaceful resolution to the crisis that is Myanmar- owned and led.” Again, that amounts to non-interference and there is nothing to indicate that such a “dialogue” is ever going to take place. Mohamad Hasan, the foreign minister of Malaysia, which is currently chair of ASEAN, said during a meeting in Langkawi in January that the elections are “not a priority.” The focus will remain on implementing the five-point consensus, but without saying how that could be done.

The Japanese foreign ministry issued a statement on Aug. 1 expressing concern about the upcoming elections and urged the Myanmar military “to take concrete actions to immediately stop the violence, release those who are detained, including… Aung San Suu Kyi, and swiftly restore Myanmar’s democratic political system. Now that the state of emergency has been lifted, Japan earnestly hopes that the Myanmar military will act sincerely.” The Myanmar military had lifted the state of emergency on July 21, but that means little as long as other stringent laws remain in place. Unlike the West, Japan wants to continue to engage the Myanmar authorities in line with its geopolitical priorities of maintaining a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” which, in plain language, means to contain China’s growing influence in Asia and beyond.

When the dust settles after the elections next month, the unavoidable reality is that the military will remain in power and whatever government is formed next year will be accepted by the powers that matter in the region. And there is precious little the West can or is prepared to do about that.