top of page

January 29, 2026

Myanmar’s Sad Election Spectacle

Global Asia

The election the Myanmar junta had pledged to hold was finally held, unfolding in three phases – on Dec. 28, 2025, Jan. 11 and Jan. 25, 2026. To nobody’s surprise, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) scored what officials called a landslide victory. It captured more than 80 percent of elected upper and lower house seats while the rest went to smaller military-aligned parties; as before, the 2008 Constitution also gave the armed forces a quarter of the seats in both houses of Parliament without a vote.


The new parliament will convene in March and will be dominated by those military officers and former officers who have become “civilians.” Under their governance, absolute military rule will remain and, moreover, after the lessons learned from the 2011-2021 decade of openness, it is highly unlikely that the freedoms people enjoyed during that time will be repeated. But the Myanmar military may believe that the elections, despite widespread international criticism, will eventually lead to recognition or at least acceptance by foreign governments.


No opposition

A new president will also be appointed, and indications are that it may be Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who headed the junta that took over five years ago. But it could also be someone more acceptable internationally, perhaps a former army officer who has become a businessman or a technocrat.


The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, won genuine landslide victories in 2015 and 2020, but was barred from participating this time because it had not agreed to be re-registered under strict new rules imposed by the junta. The same applies to several other pro-democracy parties, so there was no opposition to the USDP worth mentioning.


Judging from reports from inside the country, voter turnout was low, perhaps 50-55 percent compared to more than 70 percent in 2015 and 2020, when the elections were free and mostly fair. In 2015, the NLD was allowed to form a government but after a second victory in 2020, the military had had enough and stepped in on Feb. 1, 2021, dissolving all elected entities, killing hundreds of protesters and arresting thousands. Suu Kyi, State Chancellor before the coup, and President Win Myint remain in solitary confinement in unknown locations.


This time, the military was well prepared. In July 2025, the junta enacted a new Election Protection Law, criminalizing criticism of its planned elections. The law carried severe penalties, ranging from a minimum of three years in prison to the death penalty. Well before the first round of elections, at least 194 people were charged under this new decree, 32 were arrested and five were convicted. Two Yangon residents received sentences ranging from 42 to 49 years in prison for “disrupting the elections.”


China vs India for influence


Given that background, the West will certainly condemn the military’s maneuvers after a new government is formed. Even the usually timid Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is one of eleven members, has said it will not accept the election results. But in the long run, Myanmar’s closest neighbors and geopolitical realities will determine the legitimacy of the new government. Beijing has already congratulated the USDP on its “election victory,” largely because the authorities there want to secure their influence over a country that forms an economic corridor between China’s southwestern, inland provinces and the Indian Ocean. That route is important for exports from those landlocked provinces, and China already imports oil and gas to Yunnan via pipelines from the port of Kyaukphyu on the Burmese coast. For China, it is also about strengthening its overall position as a dominant power in the region.


India, China’s main regional rival, may be a democracy but geopolitical considerations weigh more heavily when New Delhi decides on foreign policy issues. India wants to balance as well as counter Chinese influence in Myanmar, and that helps explain why India has not criticized the military government since 2021. New Delhi wants to open new trade routes between India’s northeastern states and Myanmar’s coast in order to link up with the dynamic economies of Southeast Asia.


India also provides limited military aid and Myanmar army personnel receive training at Indian defense academies. Moreover, India has an immediate security interest in good relations with Myanmar. Ethnic, separatist rebels from the Indian states of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur have bases in the mountains of northwestern Myanmar from where they occasionally launch raids into Indian territory. India needs help from the Myanmar military to put an end to the cross-border insurgency. But the most important factor for India remains the desire to limit the spread of Chinese influence.


ASEAN again toothless


ASEAN’s refusal to accept the outcome of the elections will have no major impact on the situation inside Myanmar. ASEAN is governed by two cardinal principles: consensus and non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states. This has meant that ASEAN has never resolved a single dispute of any kind within the bloc. And then there are Australia and Japan, which have long advocated “engagement” with Myanmar’s military and opposed boycotts and harsh sanctions. They may well argue that the elections are a step in the right direction and that talks must, after all, be held with the new government. And when that happens, it is possible that even the most ardent international critics will follow suit.


Armed ethnic and political resistance remains a challenge and the polls could not be held in more than 60 of Myanmar’s 330 townships; even during the election itself, the Myanmar air force continued to bomb what it saw as rebel strongholds but in many cases were civilian gatherings such as weddings and funerals. The resistance may be determined, but it is not unified nor strong enough to pose a direct threat to the military’s grip on power.


Despite a few goodwill gestures such as lifting martial law in Yangon and releasing some prisoners on Jan. 4 to commemorate the country’s Independence Day, the unavoidable reality is that the military will, unless something truly unexpected happens, remain in power for the foreseeable future.

bottom of page